Fusion: Expensive and Taking Forever? by Lopes, Cardozo N.J. et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Fusion: Expensive and Taking Forever?
N. J. Lopes Cardozo1 • A. G. G. Lange1 • G. J. Kramer2,3
Published online: 19 September 2015
 The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The road map of fusion power is compared to
the development and deployment of other energy tech-
nologies. A generic deployment model is presented, which
describes the fastest deployment (of any new technology)
achievable with the constraint that the industrial capacity
that needs to be built up must be continuous and should not
overshoot the replacement market in the final, saturated
state. It is shown that the development needs an ‘invest-
ment’ phase to build up industrial capacity which takes
several decades, during which growth is typically expo-
nential, but net energy production is negligible. During the
exponential growth the cost is dominated by the capital
investment, which allows for a simple comparison of dif-
ferent energy technologies. Fusion is at the start of the
exponential growth phase, while still having significant
uncertainties concerning its technical feasibility. In com-
parison to e.g. solar PV and wind, fusion is ‘late’, lagging
by some 50 years. To follow the same rate of development
that fission, wind and PV have shown, fusion will need to
have 3 DEMO reactors operational in the early 2050s,
followed by 10 generation one (GEN1) plants in the early
2060s and 100 GEN2 plants in the early 2070s. For the cost
development to be comparable, an estimated allowable cost
for one DEMO reactor is *20 G$. While these indicative
numbers for the pace and cost of development are very
challenging but perhaps not unthinkable for fusion, this
analysis does point towards an emphasis on ‘simpler and
cheaper’ reactor designs.
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Introduction
Nuclear fusion has well known potential as energy tech-
nology: it is inherently safe, does not produce CO2 or other
hazardous exhaust products and neither does it produce
long-lived radioactive waste, the fuel reserves suffice for
millions of years and are not geographically concentrated,
a fusion reactor can produce power on demand and there
are no practical limits to the fraction of the world energy
demand that fusion could supply. In short: ‘Fusion is safe,
clean, for all and for ever’. This potential is the reason that
many countries collaborate in a world-spanning effort to
develop fusion energy, presently culminating in the con-
struction of the ITER test reactor by a consortium of
Europe, the USA, Japan, Russia, China, South Korea and
India [1]. In an alternative approach to controlled fusion
known as inertial confinement, the world-leading experi-
ment is the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Liver-
more National Laboratory [2].
There are also critics of the fusion programme, and their
criticism can be summarized as: ‘the development of fusion
power is extremely expensive and taking forever’. The well
known quip being that fusion promises to deliver power in
50 years and has been consistent in promising that over the
past five decades. With the political implication that the
budget for the development of fusion power could better be
redirected towards other sustainable energy options.
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It is entirely justified to ask these questions: is the
development of fusion actually expensive, is it slow, and
won’t fusion energy come too late if it comes at all? In this
paper we address these questions by placing fusion in the
context of the development of other energy sources, now
and in the past. As the starting point we take a paper by
Kramer and Haigh [3] in which the authors examine the
historical development of the installed power of a number
of energy technologies. They observe that the introduction
of a new energy technology to the market—be it nuclear
fission, solar PV, concentrating solar power, wind or bio-
mass—is characterized by two phases. First, a new tech-
nology shows an exponential growth during which the
installed power doubles every 2–4 years. Notwithstanding
the speed of this growth, this phase lasts decades. During
this time the technology is taken from laboratory scale to a
level that is visible on the radar of the world energy market,
typically at 0.1–1 % of the world energy demand. The
source has then reached ‘materiality’ in the words of
Kramer and Haigh, but its impact on world energy pro-
duction is still negligible. Around that time a transition
occurs; the growth is no longer exponential but becomes
linear, i.e. the growth rate becomes constant. This linear
growth phase lasts another few decades before the final
saturation level is reached.
In this paper we investigate how fusion fits into this
picture. Is it slow? Is it late? And we connect the devel-
opment rate to the required investment rate, in order to
address the question ‘is fusion expensive’? To do so, we
have expressed the observations of Kramer and Haigh into
a mathematical model, which we have constrained based
on economical arguments. We argue why this particular
development path is in fact the fastest implementation of a
new technology that is economically viable. We deduce
generic properties of the development of new energy
sources, both regarding the integrated cost and the point at
which the transition from exponential to linear growth
occurs. With this model, the costs and growth rates can be
easily computed and compared. We then apply the analysis
to fusion and compare this to other energy technologies, to
finally arrive at conclusions regarding the fusion road map.
Two comments before we start. First, fusion energy is not a
proven technology at this point in time. In fact there are
still large uncertainties both scientifically and technically.
One of the aims of the ITER and NIF projects is to strongly
reduce these uncertainties, but today there is no guarantee
that fusion power will ever work. However, in our analysis
we will assume that fusion will prove to be technically
feasible, and that its deployment will not be hindered by
technical, or political or economical, showstoppers. Sec-
ond, there have been a series of studies into the potential
place of fusion power in the energy mix, basically ana-
lyzing under which external conditions such as the cost of
CO2 emissions or more generically, policy measures to
reduce climate change, fusion could have a significant
market share (see e.g. ref [4] and references therein). Our
analysis has a different angle: we assume that if fusion
becomes available it will get a significant market share and
ask the question ‘how fast could fusion be deployed if all
external factors are positive, and how much may it cost?’
A Generic Model for the Development of a New
Energy Technology
The ‘Fastest Economically Achievable Growth’
Concept: Linear Growth
We consider the introduction of a new energy technology,
starting from the point where it leaves the laboratory and
ending when a stable market share has been established. To
this end, we propose a model for the development of the
total worldwide installed effective power (P) as a function
of time [5]. The development is best analysed backwards,
starting from the saturated state which we assume for the
moment to be constant.1 The fastest way in which this state
can be reached is by linear growth: any accelerating growth
wastes time at the beginning, any growth that slows down
wastes time at the end. The plant building capacity (PBC)
is constant during this linear growth phase. The saturated
state is reached when the number of old plants that are
phased out per year equals this constant PBC. Provided the
saturated state is indeed constant, the maximum plant
building capacity that is ever needed is therefore equal to
the final replacement rate, i.e. the asymptotic value of P,
Psat, divided by the lifetime slife of the plants. A faster
linear growth would result in excess PBC once the growth
saturates, i.e. idle factories and infrastructure, which is to
be avoided for economical reasons. Thus, the lifetime of
the plants places a limit on the rate of growth during linear
growth. In the model introduced below, we will therefore
equate the linear growth rate to the asymptotic replacement
rate.
1 This is a simplification. The linear growth may in fact be faster than
the replacement time if the final state shows a finite growth, as this
will call for additional industrial capacity above what is needed for
replacement. Secondly, the argument that it is not economical to build
up more industrial capacity than is eventually needed neglects the fact
that that industrial capacity itself has finite economic life, which may
be shorter than that of the installations it produces. Each of these
reasons lead to a linear growth time that may be shorter than the
lifetime of the power infrastructure, but it would still be decades.
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The Linear Growth has to be Preceded
by a Capacity Building Phase
However, the linear growth can obviously not start at full
speed on day one. The technology and industrial capacity
need to be built up first: manufacturing processes, factories,
dedicated machinery, infrastructure, supply chain of
materials, mining of raw materials, and—importantly—a
trained workforce. Possibly, legislation will need to be
adapted to allow the large-scale deployment of the new
technology, too. The energy market is, at an annual turn-
over of*10 trillion dollar, by far the largest single market
in the world. So we are speaking of a very large infras-
tructure that needs to be built up, millions of jobs that need
to be filled, and generally a significant impact on society.
Therefore, the linear growth phase has to be preceded by a
phase in which all of this is developed. As Kramer and Haigh
observe, this development is typically exponential. In themodel
we shall therefore start the development of P with a phase of
exponential growth, during which also the PBC grows expo-
nentially. This exponential growth is sustained until the PBC
reaches the value that is needed for the linear growth, which in
turn is equal to the asymptotic replacement rate. Also at the
transition fromexponential to linear growthwe require thePBC
to be continuous: the number of factories and associated
infrastructure cannot change overnight. The exponential
growth of production capacitywill therefore stop once the PBC
has been built up that will be needed to sustain the final state.
The exponential growth preceding the linear growth shows up
as a smooth leading edge on the growth curve, which finds its
reflection in a smooth transition to the saturated state.
The Growth Model
With these considerations we can write down the equations
that describe the evolution of the total worldwide installed
effective power P of an energy source (that is, if a wind
turbine with ‘nameplate capacity’ of 5 MW delivers
1.5 MW averaged over the year, then P = 1.5 MW):
P ¼ Psat sexpslife exp
t ttrans
sexp
 
exp t ttrans  slife
sexp
 
for t\ ttrans
ð1aÞ
P ¼ Psat sexpslife

1þ t ttrans
sexp
 exp t ttrans  slife
sexp
 
for ttrans  t  tsat
ð1bÞ
P ¼ Psat for t [ tsat ð1cÞ
where Psat denotes the asymptotic value in the saturated
state, sexp the characteristic time of the exponential growth,
slife the lifetime of the power-generating installations, t the
time and ttrans the time at which the transition from expo-
nential to linear growth occurs.
Figure 1 depicts the model and illustrates the parame-
ters. We distinguish three phases: the final saturated phase
at the level Psat, the linear growth phase with duration slife,
and the exponential growth phase with time constant sexp.
Note that when slife  sexp the second exponential in
Eq. (1a) is very small compared to the first.
The requirement that PBC be continuous, in other
words, that the transition from exponential to linear growth
is smooth, has a strong economical basis: discontinuity
would represent a sudden change in the underlying industry
(e.g. the number of factories). A jump up implies that there
was plant-building capacity available and sitting idle, a
jump down would mean that capacity is suddenly taken out
of use. Neither is economical. This condition fixes the level
of installed power at which the transition from exponential
growth to linear growth occurs (Ptrans), placing it at
Ptrans ¼ Psat sexpslife ð2Þ
Application to Typical Energy Systems: Coupling
a Short Doubling Time to a Long Lifetime
These two requirements give a quantitative underpinning
of the observations of Kramer and Haigh. With a typical
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Fig. 1 The development of installed effective power of a new energy
technology is modeled by three consecutive phases: exponential
growth, linear growth, and saturation. The entire development is
characterized by four parameters as indicated in the figure: the
doubling time during exponential growth, the duration of linear
growth, the time of transition from exponential to linear growth, and
the saturation level. The three phases are connected by the require-
ment that the derivative is continuous, and the requirement that the
total plant building capacity is never greater than what is needed for
replacement in the saturated phase equates the linear growth time to
the life span of the installations. For the numbers, typical values have
been taken, as will be shown in the next sections
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value of the doubling time during exponential growth of
only a few years, and a typical lifetime of power plants (be
they solar panels, wind turbines or fusion reactors) of
30–60 years, relation (2) implies that the transition from
exponential to linear growth occurs at around 10 % of the
final installed power, and that the linear growth phase lasts
almost a full lifetime (We note here, in the passing, that
this also demonstrates why the deployment of new power
generation is fundamentally different from e.g. the intro-
duction of the smart phone. For the latter, sexp and slife are
of the same order, so that the development can grow
exponentially almost to market saturation).
Plugging in some numbers for typical energy systems,
we note that a significant energy technology should be
expected to be capable of producing (at least) 10–20 % of
the world energy demand, i.e. 3–6 TW effective around
mid century. This places the exponential-to-linear growth
transition, which occurs at 10 % of the final level, at
0.3–0.6 TW. If the exponential growth starts when a
technology becomes too large for the laboratory, say at
10 MW, there are more than 4 orders of magnitude, or
some 14 doublings, to be bridged by exponential growth.
Even at a sustained doubling time of 3 years this requires
40 years, to be followed by a similar period of linear
growth. All of this is in full agreement with the observa-
tions of Kramer and Haigh.
The Exponential Growth Phase is Irrelevant
for Energy Production
It is an obvious mathematical property of exponential
growth that in the last doubling period as much new
capacity is installed as in the entire preceding development.
And since the exponential growth ends at *10 % of the
saturation level, the total energy production during the
exponential growth phase is a negligible fraction of the
total production of the installation: only a few years’ pro-
duction of only a fraction of the later installed capacity.
This holds a fortiori if we take the energy payback time of
the installations into consideration. In that case we see that,
perhaps counter-intuitively, if the payback time is longer
than the doubling time of the growth, the net energy pro-
duction is negative during the entire exponential growth
phase. All investments made during those decades precede
economic return. In general one has to realize that any new
energy technology only begins to deliver net energy once it
is in its linear growth phase.
A Generic Model: A Template for the Fusion Road
Map
The description of the development of energy technologies
turns out to allow further generalization, as the historical
data show that the doubling time during exponential
growth is rather similar for different technologies, typically
2–4 years allowing for some fluctuation over the years.
Likewise, the (expected) lifetime of the installations is
long, typically 30 or more years.
In Fig. 2 we have plotted historical data of total installed
effective power versus time for fission, wind and PV, and
compared the generic model to this data, while taking the
same fixed parameters sexp = 4.3 years (i.e. a doubling
time of 3 years) and slife = 30 years in all cases. For solar
and wind the data concern only the exponential growth,
therefore we had to take a value for Psat which we—
somewhat arbitrarily—placed at 10 % of the world energy
demand around mid-century, i.e. 3 TW. The graph shows
that the model, however crude and using the same expo-
nential growth time for all three technologies, gives a
reasonable approximation to the data. We stress that the
purpose of this exercise is not to find a best fit to each
individual data set, but rather to find a template that can be
used to make projections for fusion.
Noting that such diverse technologies as fission, PV and
wind develop following so similar patterns, we propose to
use that pattern for the development of fusion power, too.
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Fig. 2 The total globally installed effective power as function of
time. The solid lines are data for world energy demand [6], and power
from fission [7], wind [8] and solar PV [9]. The dashed lines represent
the generic growth model introduced in this paper. The model uses
the same 3-year doubling time for the exponential growth in all cases.
For fission, the final level has been chosen such that a match is
achieved until 1986, after which the data flatten out abruptly as a
result of the Chernobyl accident. This template has been adopted to
sketch a road map for fusion. Also for the costs of fusion numbers
have been taken that are comparable to those for other technologies,
so as to get a rough idea of what cost bracket should be targeted. Note
that this is effective installed power, i.e. the capacity factor is factored
in. Hence the DEMO point at 1 GWe should be expected to be
realized by e.g. 3 DEMOs of 1 GWe output power each with a
capacity factor of 30 % and a cost around 20 G$ each (see
‘‘Economics of the Growth’’ section)
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Economics of the Growth
Exponential Growth is an Investment into Future
New Energy
The observation that a fast growing technology does not
deliver net energy is not a criticism. As long as the eco-
nomic life of the system is much longer than its energy
payback time, each individual unit will have a net energy
output over its lifetime. But it is equally true that as long as
the total installed power is growing exponentially, there is
no significant global net energy production. The expo-
nential growth phase is a necessary investment into a new
energy system, not more, not less. Net energy production
only starts to build up during the linear growth phase. It is
an obvious yet perhaps surprising observation that the
introduction of a new energy source calls for a period of
investment that extends over about 4 decades and precedes
any form of energy or economic payback on the global
scale. In practical terms this means that e.g. the solar panels
that are being deployed on a large scale in Germany may
locally lead to a reduction of CO2 emission, but this is
offset by a larger increase of CO2 emission in the countries
where the panels are produced. Another consequence of the
fact that during exponential growth the energy production
is negligible is that the substantial investment needed must
be pre-financed. And as there is no product to sell yet, the
financial burden must necessarily be carried by govern-
ments, taxpayers, or society at large. Financial payback
only starts when the development is well into the linear
growth phase. This is another generic feature of exponen-
tial growth of new energy technologies: they must be pre-
financed, one way or another. The magnitude of the
cumulative investment (see below) and the time to financial
breakeven puts the de novo development of a new energy
technology beyond the reach of even the largest companies,
and points to a necessary role for government.
How Large is the Investment Until Materiality?
It is now a straightforward exercise to compute the
investment needed to bring a new energy technology to the
end of its exponential growth. In this phase the annual
spending will be dominated by the cost of building new
plants, i.e. the capital costs. The overnight capital costs
(OCC) are well documented for different energy tech-
nologies [10], a short summary is given in Table 1. Note
that in order to compare the overnight investment capital
costs per W of effective installed power, the capacity fac-
tors need to be taken into account.
Applying the commonly found cost reduction of a factor
2 per factor 10 installed power [12], we can extrapolate this
to a common benchmark, for which we will take 300 GW.
This is about 1 % of the mid century total world demand
and can be assumed to be close to the end of the expo-
nential growth. We use 10 $/W as an average value at this
point, taking into account the fact that the capacity factors
of the emerging technologies are high in the US case.
Using the numbers given in Table 1, we find the total
invested capital to be 2–4 thousand billion dollar up until
materiality for wind and solar. The spending profile follows
the exponential development, i.e. half of this investment is
made in the last few years of the exponential growth, when
the annual spending reaches hundreds of billion dollars per
year. All of this investment precedes the net energy pro-
duction. This calculation does not take into account the
financing costs, which are obviously high for multi-billion
dollar projects. With an interest rate of 7.5 % and a con-
struction time of 10 years, the cost has almost doubled
before the installation has been taken into operation, while
at the end of the life of the installations the financing costs
have run up to *2.5 times the overnight capital invest-
ment. The bottom line is that the development of any new
energy source calls for an investment of a few thousand
billion dollars before global net energy production reaches
a level at which payback starts.
Let us now place fusion energy in this temporal and
financial context.
Placing Fusion Energy in this Framework
Could Fusion Follow the Same Universal Growth
Curve?
Seeing that such different technologies as wind, PV and
fission all have shown exponential growth rates with a
doubling time of typically 3 years, we’ll take this as our
reference. Hence, rather than trying to predict how fast
fusion power could grow, we reverse the question and ask:
what should the fusion road map look like if it wants to
adhere to the reference?
The first machine that will harvest electricity from
fusion is generically called DEMO. The fusion road maps
[13] of Europe, South Korea, China, and India all foresee
their own DEMO starting operation in 2040–2050. These
designs typically aim at 1–2 GWe. They are meant to
deliver to the grid, but most likely—our addition—at a
modest capacity factor: 30 % effective, multi-annual
averaged availability would already be an achievement.
We note, as a reference, that the first generation of fission
plants also targeted very modest availability, and increased
their capacity factor from*0.5 to*0.9 between 1970 and
2000 [14]. This assumption would place the DEMO
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point—i.e. the combined DEMO reactors—at an estimated
1 GW total effective power in 2050.
After DEMO, the first generation (GEN 1) of fusion
plants could be envisaged to be DEMO-like, with some-
what improved plant efficiency and availability, and more
economical construction. The European Power Plant con-
ceptual study explores several concepts for this phase in the
development [15]. In order to stay on the generic devel-
opment path, 10 GEN1 plants are needed to start operation
within 10 years after the DEMO’s. After that GEN2, about
100 plants with similar characteristics as GEN1 but
reduced cost and improved availability, is to follow in a
decade. This would bring fusion to materiality, at about
1 % of the world energy demand, around 2070.
In Fig. 2 we have plotted such a projection of the
development of fusion power into the graph with other
energy technologies.
The graph makes clear that fusion is in any case late
compared to other technologies: it lags by some 50 years at
least. Yet, even with this late start, if fusion realizes the
same 3-year doubling time, it could enter the energy mix in
2070. At this time, the world most likely is still in the
transition to sustainable energy production, and depending
on how e.g. PV, wind and biomass are doing, fusion could
provide a much-needed complement.
However, with today’s knowledge and the experience of
ITER, these may seem unrealistically fast steps. Yet, these
are the steps that are required to develop and deploy fusion
power at the same rate of exponential growth that has been
realized for fission, PV and wind in the past. Also for these
technologies an incredibly fast growth of the industry was
needed to sustain the rapid exponential growth. It would
need to be analyzed if fusion has technological aspects that
would prevent it from realizing an exponential show with a
3-year doubling time. This could e.g. depend on the
availability of materials for superconducting magnets or
the efficiency of tritium breeding in operational fusion
reactors. For now, we merely want to illustrate what is
needed to let fusion develop as fast as other power
technologies.
Looking at it in a different way: if fusion is expected to
develop its potential and eventually deliver e.g. 30 % of
world energy, i.e. *10 TW, then the fusion industry
should sustain a park of some 10,000 plants. With a
50-year lifetime, that is 200 reactors per year. With this
perspective, it is not strange at all that GEN2 calls for the
construction of 100 plants in 10 years. That is only 10 a
year.
And we emphasize that during exponential growth the
associated rate of investment must grow exponentially, too.
The fusion community is presently struggling to realize
ITER within 20 years, so building 10 GEN1 plants in
10 years may seem a daunting task. But it should be real-
ized that the associated budget should be tens of billions
dollars per year and that this task should be in the hands of
an industry that by then is specializing in the construction
of fusion reactors.
We also point here out that all new energy technologies
that are presently in the research phase have not even
started their exponential growth yet. So fusion may have a
late start, it is certainly not the last one to start.
Is Fusion Expensive?
To address the cost of the development of fusion power we
will again resort to a reverse analysis. If fusion is to be
competitive by the time it reaches materiality, at around 0.3
TW installed power, the overnight capital investment
should have dropped to *10 $/W (today’s money)—al-
lowing for a further cost reduction during the linear
Table 1 Typical values for overnight capital cost (OCC) per Watt
installed (name plate) power, as well as per watt effective power
(OCCeff) for a few energy technologies. As a reference coal and gas
are given, with and without carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).
The values are taken from the United States Energy Information
Administration [10, 11], where solar and wind have capacity factors
above the global average, whereas coal and gas have capacity factors
well below their technical capacity, because they are used as demand
followers
OCC [10] Cap. factor [11] OCCeff Growth phase Installed Peff OCCeff at 0.3TW
($/W) ($/Weff) Status [10] or (GW) (GW) ($/Weff)
Coal (IGCC) 4.40 0.60 7.4 Mature
Coal (IGCC) ? CCS 6.60 0.60 11.1 Revolutionary (CCS)
Gas (advanced CC) 1.02 0.48 2.1 Mature
Gas (advanced CC) ? CCS 2.10 0.48 4.3 Revolutionary (CCS)
Nuclear 5.53 0.90 6.2 Mature
Wind onshore 2.21 0.39 5.7 360.8 [8] 140.4 4.5
Wind offshore 6.23 0.39 16.0 8.8 [8] 3.4 4.2
Solar PV (20 MW) 4.18 0.28 15.0 177 [9] 49.2 8.7
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deployment phase. Again adopting the commonly used cost
decrease of a factor of two per ten times more installed
power, that places the price tag at 1GW—the ‘three DEMO
point’-, at*60 $/W, i.e.*20 G$ per DEMO. Considering
the cost of ITER this may seem low, but not totally off the
mark, as DEMO should be a simpler machine than ITER,
albeit larger and equipped with the electricity generating
plant that ITER lacks.
Discussion and Conclusions
In summary, following the lead of ref [1], we have
developed a simple model based on economical consider-
ations that describes the development and deployment of a
new power technology in a generic form. By comparing
this model to historic development data of fission, solar PV
and wind we found a rather generic pattern, in which an
exponential growth with a doubling time of 3 years is
followed by a linear growth that essentially lasts one plant
lifetime. As this pattern is seen for such diverse tech-
nologies as fission, PV and wind, we propose that fusion
could be expected to follow the same pattern.
In that case, fusion—while having a late start, lagging
behind solar PV by about 50 years—could reach 100 GW
of effective installed power by 2070 and impact the world
energy system significantly by the turn of the century. This
development is only viable if the overnight investment cost
drops to about 10 $/W by the time the linear growth starts.
Assuming an experience curve of a factor of 2 per factor of
10 installed power, this leads to a target for the cost of a
single DEMO device of*20 G$, which will be a challenge
but may not be totally unrealistic.
So fusion is late, but there is no reason today to say it is
slow or expensive. Yet, the numbers presented here do
suggest that for DEMO, the emphasis will have to be on
simplicity of design and minimization of cost and con-
struction time.
We do note that once the exponential growth has started,
there is little time for concept improvement. With the
generations following each other within a decade, GEN2
will look similar to GEN1. It is therefore essential that in
the DEMO phase the world has settled on the most
promising concept, or develops e.g. the tokamak and stel-
larator lines in parallel.
What sets fusion apart from e.g. wind and solar is the
coarse granularity of the development. In particular DEMO
and GEN1 represent large steps in technology, with large
associated financial risk. As we argued, the exponential
growth must necessarily be funded by governments for all
new energy technologies, and fusion is no different there.
But the financial risks involved in each of the steps of the
fusion roadmap are large compared to those in the much
more gradual development seen in wind and solar power.
This is clearly a drawback for fusion.
On the other hand, it must be realized that the spending
profile follows the growth curve, and that the early phase of
exponential growth requires funds that are insignificant
when compared to the final integrated investment. Hence,
the sums involved in launching each generation of new
fusion plants will seem staggering at the time they have to
be made, but if the programme is successful they will
appear as logical and not out of the ordinary in retrospect.
Finally, we may ask how ITER fits in this picture.
Although ITER does not produce net electricity, one could
assign a virtual net power to it by taking its predicted
fusion power, ignore the input and recirculating power, and
convert this to electricity with e.g. 30 % efficiency. Next, a
capacity factor has to be assigned. Clearly, if ITER is run
as an experiment this factor is vanishingly low. But as a
thought experiment, one could imagine to run ITER as
efficiently as possible, with a high frequency of pulses. A
capacity factor of 5–10 % might be feasible. This would
put the virtual effective power of ITER at 10 MW, which
lies on the line in Fig. 2. So in terms of ‘virtual’ power,
ITER fits in the sequence ITER—DEMO—GEN1—GEN2.
When it comes to the overnight cost, however, ITER
clearly is far too expensive for its power. Which empha-
sizes the fact that ITER marks the transition from research
to development.
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